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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 04/01/2008

Accident number: 460

Accident time: 08:21

Accident Date: 16/09/2004

Where it occurred: MF ID 11290,
Odmutsko Polje 1 Grebnice,
Domaljevac-Samac

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 05/10/2004

ID original source: None

Name of source: BHMAC WL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: leaf litter
metal scrap
wet
woodland (bush)

Date record created: 04/01/2008

Date last modified: 04/01/2008

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: y=6 542 141 x=4 988
597

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
squatting to excavate (?)
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Accident report
This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the
DDAS. The content of the reports that were made available has been edited for anonymity
and is summarised below.
[Work was being conducted by a partnership between two national commercial demining
groups.]
An accident report was written by an investigative committee of BHMAC and signed by [Name
removed] (presiding the committee), [Name removed] and [Name removed]. Another
document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining Accident 16
September 2004”, dated 5 October 2004 (the same date as the accident report), signed by
the BHMAC director, [Name removed]. This second document contains no new information
and repeats the recommendations of the investigative committee.

Conditions at the site
The minefield is in the village Grebnice, stretching along the road Orašje-Šamac. 50 metres
south from the minefield there is a primary school. The minefield and the place of accident is
swampy with soft soil, thick grass, bush and some trees. The area is flat and heavily
contaminated with litter and metal peaces. The accident occurred during the assignment
labelled ID 11290. The geographical coordinates of two victims were:
y = 6 542 141, x = 4 988 597 for the fatally injured deminer,
y = 6 542 198, x = 4 988 607 for the injured deminer.
The weather at the time of the accident was cloudy and it had just started to rain. Due to rain
the work has been stopped. The accident happened immediately after the work had been
stopped.

[Accident site (crater in centre).]
The area around the accident has been disturbed after the accident and some pegs and
tapes were obviously placed after the accident.

The purpose of the demining task
The main reason was to allow safe school attendance. Other reasons: the supervision of the
state border (50 metres from Sava river, the border to Croatia), safe usage of the nearby road
Orašje-Šamac, enabling the rebuilding of the infrastructure, agricultural use of the land and
general safety.
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The work-site layout and marking
The work-site had not been established according to the National Standards of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the SOPs. The administrative areas were established on the safe distance,
but the area was not properly marked.

[Vegetation at the site.]
Supervision and discipline on the work-site
The highest level of supervision was done by the work-site leader [Name removed], working
for UG ZOM. The internal quality control (IQC) was done by [Name removed], who visited the
work-site 26 July, 30 July, 1 August, 2 August, 5 August and 12 September 2004. In his
reports, he failed to make a note about obvious important errors regarding SOPs.
The team leader [Name removed], working for [Partner commercial demining group], was
responsible for the deminers where the accident happened. His did not supervise well; he had
noticed that the deminers work without PPE, but he did nothing.
The company management never visited the work-site, although that was necessary,
concerning the organisation and discipline at the work-site. There is an impression that the
relations between [partner demining groups] are not in order; we were informed about some
earlier problems.

Quality assurance
Until the day of the accident, [the site] has evidenced the following irregularities: two deminers
working without helmets, no clearance overlap between the lanes, increased productivity,
work 70 cm ahead of the base line, detectors Ebinger 2634 and 2644 have sensitivity lower
than allowed. [The demining group] also gave some warnings and recommendations: the
team leader was warned on the movements of the local population nearby; too much metal
contamination, 100 m2 were returned for clearance; metal detector MD-8 gives continuously a
signal, 45 m2 returned for clearance; recommended to increase the mutual distance 50 m due
to possible PROM-1.
The investigative committee has established that the documentation from the work-site is not
adequate, not according to the Standard of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The monitoring from the
monitoring organisations had not been performed.

Medical support, injuries
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The medical support was according to the Standard of Bosnia and Herzegovina (equipment,
vehicle and personnel). The paramedic was on the place of the accident in 2 or 3 minutes.
First he approached deminer [Victim No.1] in lane 4 and established heavy injuries. Than the
paramedic went to lane 5 to [Victim No.2], while a deminer who used to be a paramedic of
APM stayed with [Victim No.1]. [Victim No.2] was conscious; his left upper leg was heavily
bleeding. After receiving first aid, he was transported to the hospital in Orašje (14.6 km away).
He survived. [Victim No.1] had injuries of upper legs, head and other body parts. After being
brought into the vehicle he did not show any signs of life. The official cause of death:
explosive wounds on the whole body.
The two deminers were insured according to the law and the Standard for Clearance of
Landmines and UXO of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 200.000 BAM for death, 250.000 for heavy
injuries. However, only 10 of 23 persons present at the work-site have been insured,
according to the documentation. Either the documentation was not complete, or the
organisation manipulates the insurance.

PPE and tools
The two deminers participating in the accident were not wearing their PPE. (It is not clear
from the available documents if any PPE was issued to the deminers.) The team leader
claimed that the reason was that he had already given the order to stop the work. PPE could
have prevented most of the injuries of [Victim No.2]. The metal detector of [Victim No.1] was
checked and it was functioning properly. However, it has been established that some metal
detectors were not used at the required sensitivity.
[The detector shown in a site photograph was the Ebinger EBEX 420 PB.]
Demining company [Name removed] had another demining accident 5 August 2004, when the
injured deminer did not wear his helmet. [DDAS457]

The mine
The PROM-1 was placed to be activated by a direct contact with the foot, with the star above
the ground surface. A tripwire was not found.

Activities of the deminer immediately before the accident
In a non-marked lane, deminer [Victim No.1] tried to identify the source of a metal-detector
signal by using a prodder and an excavation tool. He possibly used the prodder and the
excavation tool simultaneously to achieve higher productivity. The star of the PROM-1 was
above the ground surface. Therefore it is not likely that the mine was activated with a prodder.
It is most likely that it was activated with inappropriate excavation tool. The examination of the
area cleared in the days before the accident leads to the conclusion that vertical excavation
had been performed, which is characteristic for non-demining tools and against the Standard
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the SOP of the company.

Recommendations of the investigative committee
It is recommended to temporarily withdraw the accreditation for demining from the demining
organisation [Demining group]; to temporarily withdraw (on 6 months) the personal
accreditation for demining from the team leader [Name removed] from [Second Demining

4

group in partnership]; to mark and clear the area demined between 10 and 16 September
2004 with a stronger control of BHMAC; and to distribute the conclusions and the
recommendations of this investigation to demining organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusion
The deminer worked in a non-marked lane without wearing any PPE. The accident was
caused by inappropriate excavation of PROM-1, probably with inappropriate tools. As a
consequence, the deminer activating the mine died and another deminer at 59 metres
distance suffered severe injuries.
The demining company had violated procedures defined in the Standard for Bosnia and
Herzegovina and their own SOPs. The documentation was inadequate and incomplete, the
marking was inadequate, metal-detectors were used on lower sensitivities or they were
malfunctioning, inadequate excavation (vertical excavation and inadequate tool) was
performed, PPE was not used, the recommendation of the investigations of earlier accidents
were not followed, some detectors were used with a sensitivity lower than the requirement of
the Standard.

Victim Report
Victim number: 610

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: After being brought into the ambulance he did not show any signs of life. The
official cause of death: explosive wounds on the whole body. No Medical report was made
available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 611

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None
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Short visor
Helmet

Summary of injuries:
severe Leg
COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical report
No formal medical report was made available.
After the accident Victim No.2 was conscious and his left upper leg was heavily bleeding.
After receiving first aid, he was transported to the hospital in Orašje (14.6 km away). He
survived.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because
the investigators recommended the removal of accreditation from the organisation because of
the many breaches of SOP at the task, including an apparent failure to insure deminers
adequately. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the field
controllers lacked the authority (or the knowledge) to impose the safety requirements in the
SOPs.
The second victim suffered a severe leg wound at 59 metres, which is the farthest secondary
injury from a PROM-1 in HD on record, and may require a revision of safe working distances
in areas where active PROM-1s can be anticipated. That said, the victim’s PPE would not
have covered his legs anyway. The 360 degree spread of fragments over this distance makes
it very unlikely that he was hit by more than one fragment.
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